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Written by Jeff Zhou

Jeff Zhou is currently pursuing a Master in Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, with a focus on international and global affairs. His background spans venture capital, civic innovation, and global advocacy. At Untapped Ventures, an early-stage fund investing in agentic AI, Jeff led investor relations and portfolio operations for a network of startups, while managing public-private partnerships to support inclusive economic growth.

Outside of work, Jeff serves as Regional Director at The Borgen Project, mobilizing support to fight global poverty and meeting with congressional offices to advocate for U.S. leadership in international development. He also supports campaign finance reform through AI-driven outreach at American Promise and contributes foreign policy analysis as the MENA Correspondent for the Young Diplomats Society. An active member of the United Nations Association and Foreign Policy for America, Jeff aims to use both policy and entrepreneurship to tackle complex global challenges.

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Abstract 

With the Russo-Ukrainian conflict ongoing, Ukraine faces a deepening crisis of military desertion and recruitment amid a prolonged war of attrition. While Ukraine continues to resist Russian occupation with substantial Western military and financial assistance, mounting casualties, extended frontline deployments, and rigid mobilization policies have eroded morale within the armed forces. This article investigates the scale and drivers of desertion in Ukraine, drawing on official statistics and firsthand accounts from deserters. It evaluates Ukraine’s current affairs within a broader historical context, highlighting parallels with World War I trench warfare, where exhaustion and inelastic command structures sparked widespread desertion. The analysis also identifies political corruption, both within the military and at senior levels of government, as a crucial factor subverting trust and discipline. Finally, the article examines prospects for reform, assessing proposed leadership changes within Ukraine’s military and the impact of shifting Western political support, particularly from the U.S. Together, these dynamics suggest that desertion is not merely a disciplinary issue but a structural challenge with critical implications for Ukraine’s capacity to sustain its war effort.

Introduction 

Nearly four years after its conception, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has become bogged down in a war of attrition. Russia still occupies approximately 20 percent of the country after capturing over four thousand square kilometers of territory in 2024 (Center for Preventive Action, 2025). However, Ukraine refuses to surrender and continues to launch drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure and military sites. Since January 2022, they’ve received almost $175 billion in aid from the U.S. and $197 billion in aid from the EU (Masters & Merrow, 2025). But as the war drags on, Ukraine’s human cost, particularly its military losses, is increasingly difficult to quantify. A 2025 study by CSIS estimated between 60,000 and 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed, with total casualties reaching around 400,000 (Jones & McCabe, 2025). As those figures climb and the war shows no sign of ending, Zelensky’s administration faces a worsening crisis: rising desertion and low recruitment. 

The Russian military is also experiencing a desertion crisis, with some 70,000 soldiers expected to abandon their units this year (Khomenko, 2025). However, the number of confirmed cases appears lower than in Ukraine. Indeed, Valentyn Manko, top commander of storm troops, told the Ukrainian Pravda, “Even in Russia, there aren’t that many soldiers going AWOL” (Al Jazeera, 2025). Additionally, Ukraine has a much smaller population, so losing hundreds of thousands to desertion has a far greater impact on its ability to buttress frontline operations and troop rotations. To make matters worse, Ukrainian commanders often attribute soaring desertion to extreme exhaustion, understaffing in the infantry, and stalled mobilization goals – all of which damage morale.

Inside the stories of Ukrainian deserters 

On February 24 2022, the day Russia initiated its full‑scale invasion, Zelensky signed a mandate imposing martial law and announcing a general mobilization across Ukraine. Although most men aged 18-60 were forbidden from escaping the country, conscripts and reservists were called up first (Reuters, 2022). As fighting intensified and losses surged, the government repeatedly expanded general mobilization and even passed new legislation to widen the draft, including lowering the mobilization age from 27 to 25. While many citizens understood these progressively extreme measures, not everyone agreed with them.

For instance, Yevgeny, a 39-year-old construction worker from Kyiv, left Ukraine for Moldova, claiming that he felt trapped in his home country. Yevgeny told a BBC journalist, “Not everyone is a warrior… you don’t need to keep the whole country locked up. You can’t lump everyone together like they did in the Soviet Union” (Marocico & Brown, 2023). Another deserter, who wished to stay anonymous, was willing to sacrifice his life at the onset of the war (Harding, 2025). Initially, he volunteered to defend Kyiv as enemy tanks approached and joined Ukraine’s armed forces. In the spring of 2023, he was stationed in the village of Tonenke, near the eastern city of Avdiivka. Eventually though, he became disillusioned when his superiors issued unrealistic orders. After being wounded in battle, he was ordered back to the front, which made him realize that he was “just a number”. In May that same year, he left his position to seek further medical treatment and never came back. 

Yevgeny and the anonymous individual are just two among numerous Ukrainians who have deserted. Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office disclosed that from early 2022 to October 2025 there were roughly 56,200 criminal cases for desertion and 255,000 for AWOL (Stezhensky, 2025). The primary difference between the two actions lies in an “intention to leave the service for good”. A soldier may be accused of desertion 24 hours after abandoning his military unit – an offense that can carry a 5-12 year prison sentence. Meanwhile, going AWOL is punishable by up to 10 years in jail. To tackle this predicament, Zelensky’s administration has granted amnesty to first-time deserters, allowing them to return to their units without any punishment (Fornusek, 2024). The issue is that many people choose to remain in jail. 

Historical parallels and other drivers of desertion in Ukraine 

Ukraine isn’t grappling with a unique phenomenon, as desertion has existed as long as organized warfare. The early empires (Mesopotamia and Greece) treated desertion as both a military and religious transgression because soldiers swore sacred oaths to rulers and gods. The Romans considered desertion such a serious violation that it was punishable by death (Levush, 2016). Several centuries later, in Medieval Europe, desertion became much more common, as armies were loosely organized, pay was irregular, and loyalty was personal. A lot of deserters simply went home or switched lords. As conflicts grew more widespread, desertion was once again deemed a serious offense. In World War I, the British Army executed over 300 servicemen for desertion and cowardice, while France and Italy employed firing squads to enforce discipline (Sweeney, 1999). However, the shift to volunteer armed forces in most countries eventually led to a decline in desertion rates. 

Against this historical context, Ukraine’s present situation most closely resembles that of World War I, when exhausted trench armies experienced thousands of desertions amid brutal fighting. Ukrainian soldiers complain of having to suffer for days on end under heavy fire without a pause because there’s no one to relieve them (Vinohradov and Shtekel, 2022). Some have even reported being stuck on the frontlines since the very beginning of the invasion. Troops are permitted to take 10 days off twice a year, but manpower shortages sometimes delay those vacations. Opponents of the conscription decree contend that its rigidity further undermines morale, since conscripts have no legal way to leave the military except in specific cases, such as caring for a minor, a child with a disability, or a spouse with a serious illness or disability (Fratsyvir, 2025).

Another significant factor driving the desertion crisis is political corruption. In December 2024, Anna Skorokhod, People’s Deputy of Ukraine (ironically, a year later she would be accused of bribery and face property arrest), raised concerns on Telegram about commanders demanding bribes in exchange for exemption from frontline duty. At first, the amounts were up to 5,000 hryvnias (US$125); now they’ve risen to five times that sum. That same month, the Ukrainian online newspaper Strana corroborated Skorokhod’s comments, writing, “Corruption in the AFU is no longer just ‘corruption’, it is a disaster. If you have money and no desire to go to the front, you can buy your way out” (Kovalevich, 2024). 

Corruption within the rank and file is minor compared to the scandal uncovered in Zelensky’s administration in November 2025. A 15-month investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) discovered that senior officials allegedly stole millions from Energoatom, the state nuclear company (Harding, 2025). Detectives secretly recorded conversations in flats and offices around Kyiv, exposing a scheme to embezzle at least $100m from Energoatom using kickbacks of 10-15% on contracts. Key government figures, including Timur Mindich and Ihor Myroniuk, reputedly pressured contractors to comply by abusing martial law to block payments and threaten blacklisting. The fallout of this scandal disrupted Ukraine’s logistics, as two ministers resigned, military funds got misallocated, and public confidence in donor countries declined regarding the effectiveness of continued support. Arguably, though, the greatest damage inflicted by high-level corruption has been on desertion and recruitment (Wolff & Malyarenko, 2025).

Leadership reform and fading Western resolve 

It remains to be seen whether there’s a way out of the desertion crisis in Ukraine. Tatarigami, founder of Frontelligence Insight, believes that the government must carry out comprehensive military reform to establish a more modern defense force, starting at the very top of the military hierarchy (Re: Russia, 2025). Generals who advanced through the ranks in the 1990s and 2000s, with limited combat experience, should be replaced by officers seasoned in contemporary warfare. Additionally, introducing a merit-based rotation system for senior commanders could prove beneficial. As times grow increasingly desperate, Ukraine’s army is adopting best practices from NATO members and its own elite brigades, which have established independent training centers and continue to attract volunteers (Radio Liberty, 2025).

Donald Trump’s inauguration as U.S. President further complicates the situation. His impromptu social media post in May 2025 compelled Zelensky to invite Putin to peace talks in Istanbul, briefly boosting morale among Ukrainian troops, who hoped the conflict would soon end (Wintour, 2025). However, Putin turned down the offer and no deal materialized, causing desertions to surge again. Then, in October 2025, Steve Witkoff, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East, covertly met with Putin’s adviser, Kirill Dmitriev, to draft a 28-point plan, which Ukraine and its European allies strongly rejected. Overall, the Trump administration’s “wait-and-see” stance, characterized by the withholding of Tomahawks and the easing of Russian sanctions, has contributed to frontline soldiers’ perception that their indefinite sacrifices lack Western backing. It’s eerily reminiscent of South Vietnam’s post-Tet Offensive collapse, when U.S. support waned after claims of a “light at the end of the tunnel” crumbled against tenacious enemy resistance, leaving the South to fend for itself (Lange, 2016). 

Ultimately, logistics and advanced weaponry play important roles in military success, but manpower remains a decisive factor. Entering its fourth winter of total war, Ukraine is battling both Russian troops and skyrocketing desertion. Beyond the immediate strategic risks, a more troubling question arises: what will happen after the war, and how many deserters will return? Ukraine already has one of the lowest birth rates in the world, so if most deserters fail to come back, the country could suffer a demographic collapse. Moreover, losing a generation of able-bodied men weakens reserves for a possible future Russian re-invasion. Ukraine’s survival and recovery are closely intertwined with the desertion crisis. 

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