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Written by Jeff Zhou

Jeff Zhou is currently pursuing a Master in Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, with a focus on international and global affairs. His background spans venture capital, civic innovation, and global advocacy. At Untapped Ventures, an early-stage fund investing in agentic AI, Jeff led investor relations and portfolio operations for a network of startups, while managing public-private partnerships to support inclusive economic growth.

Outside of work, Jeff serves as Regional Director at The Borgen Project, mobilizing support to fight global poverty and meeting with congressional offices to advocate for U.S. leadership in international development. He also supports campaign finance reform through AI-driven outreach at American Promise and contributes foreign policy analysis as the MENA Correspondent for the Young Diplomats Society. An active member of the United Nations Association and Foreign Policy for America, Jeff aims to use both policy and entrepreneurship to tackle complex global challenges.

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Abstract

The world is in the midst of a resurgent wave of right-wing populism, driven, in part, by angry young men grappling with challenges in mental health and relationships. Indeed, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to ignore a growing reality: the once-hopeful vision of Gen Z paving the way for a more progressive future is gradually fading away. The article examines the case of Brenton Tarrant, perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shootings, to explore the complexfactors that can lead a seemingly normal young man down a path of hate and destruction. It also analyzes the role of technology, particularly social media, in amplifying the messaging of right-wing populism that touches young men’s souls. The article argues that the left has failed to connect with young men on a personal level, making it easy for right-wing populism to fill that emotional void. It concludes by asserting that this is not merely a political issue, but a human one because when young men fall behind, the ramifications reverberate across all of society.

Introduction

Populism was once regarded as an extreme but fleeting political development. It turned out to be anything but. Today, the concept remains hotly debated among contemporary academics; some argue it’s too ambiguous to be useful, while others maintain it’s too prevalent in political debate to discard. What is undeniable, however, is that the populist wave has now transformed into a full-blown movement sweeping across the world.

In 2017, the United States’ foremost conference for hard-right conservatives, CPAC, included only one prominent foreign speaker, Britain’s Nigel Farage. Eight years later, CPAC was filled with nationalists and right-wing populists from all corners of the globe, from Argentina’s President Javier Milei to Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Populism had finally attained mainstream status (Constantini, 2025).

As with any hot political ideology, there’s an urgent push to understand its key drivers. Rising income inequality is one of the most frequently cited causes, especially after the 2008 financial crisis crippled the American and European middle class. Another theory proposed by certain researchers is the modernization losers thesis, which contends that populism is a defense mechanism to deal with deep-rooted cultural anxieties in the face of modern economic and social transformations (Bäckman, 2013). However, going beyond surface-level analysis, one can identify a troubling thread that binds all these factors together: young, male, and online.

Young Men in Crisis

On March 15 2019, 28-year old Brenton Tarrant carried out shootings at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, killing 51 people. This turned out to be the deadliest mass murder event in the country’s modern history. The entire populace was shocked and looking for answers.

What made the tragedy so difficult to grasp was the perpetrator’s background. Tarrant worked as a gym trainer and had no criminal record prior to the Christchurch attack. He didn’t have any close friends, but one acquaintance vouched for him as a “fit and proper” individual (Royal Commission of Inquiry, 2020). Tarrant was also financially independent, living off his father’s inheritance and traveling around the world. From the outset, investigators struggled to comprehend why an ordinary young man with no major stressors (i.e. money problems) would commit such a horrific act. Then, Tarrant started talking.

He told investigators that he regularly visited right-wing discussion boards on 4chan and 8chan, anonymous forums known for their lax censorship and moderation policies. Indeed, for four years before his rampage, Tarrant had been ranting about the need to hurt people of colour in locations of “significance”, including places of worship (Wilson et al., 2024). Yet no action was taken by authorities. Additionally, Tarrant confessed that YouTube was “a significant source of information and inspiration”. While diving deeper into the dark web, he joined a South Otago gun club and practiced shooting at its range.

Tarrant’s heinous actions and hate-filled manifesto, laced with anti-immigrant sentiment, make him an extreme case of right-wing populism gone wrong. However, his specific profile is becoming increasingly commonplace in the populist space. Across the U.S., Canada, and much of Europe, disenfranchised young men are shifting their support from liberal or left-leaning parties to right-wing anti-establishment parties (Milosav et al., 2024).

This trend is particularly striking given that young women have remained generally progressive. In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, young men (ages 18-29) supported Donald Trump by a 14-point margin, while young women backed Kamala Harris by 17 points (Tufts University, 2024). A similar gender divide is surfacing in Asia, as nearly 30% of South Korean men aged 18-29 intended to vote for the right-wing Reform Party, compared to just 3% of young women (Eun Gong, 2024). It’s important to note that political identities are shaped by a variety of factors, from religion to income, so focusing solely on gender provides an incomplete picture. Moreover, other confounding variables may contribute to these figures. Nonetheless, this divergence raises deeper questions.

The child who is not embraced by the village will burn it down to feel its warmth

Brenton Tarrant is an ardent follower of the “Great Replacement” conspiracy, which claims that white populations in Western countries are being deliberately “replaced” by non-white immigrants, particularly from Muslim-majority nations (Jedinger et al., 2023). A central tenet of this conspiracy is the belief that elites are orchestrating efforts to tackle declining birth rates, as white Europeans and Americans are having fewer children. Tararnt sees “mainstream” policies as ineffective in addressing the demographic crisis, rejecting all moderate solutions.

From an outsider’s perspective, these views may seem quite unhinged, but they contain a sliver of truth that resonates with many young men, notably the inability to start families and raise children. A 2024 survey by the Pew Research Center discovered that 57% of young men (ages 18-34) in the U.S. want children one day, but only 45% of young women share that desire (Aragão, 2024). To make matters worse, 60% of these young men are single, almost twice the rate of single young women. The consequences go beyond declining birth rates, highlighted by the “Great Replacement” conspiracy, to greater concerns over overall well-being. We’re already observing a widening disparity in suicide rates, with young men taking their own lives at four times the rate of young women (Reeves & Secker, 2023). Most don’t end up like Brenton Tarrant, but many are just as romantically uninvolved, friendless, and lonely.

Some consider suicides and mass shootings to be isolated incidents that don’t prove young men’s heightening alienation. But one phenomenon that cannot be easily brushed off is Hikikomri, a Japanese term for severe social withdrawal that predominantly affects young men. Media reports in 2019 revealed that over one million people in Japan were living as hikikomori, 63.3% of which were men aged 15-39 (Tajan, 2021). In recent years, the number of female hikikomoris has increased, with women now representing 45% of those aged 15-39, up from 37% in a 2015 survey. However, the majority of hikikomori in this age group are still male. Several theories attempt to explain this gender imbalance, the main one being that Japanese society places disproportionate pressure on men to succeed both professionally and socially. Tradition plays a role as well. Customarily, young women live with their parents until marriage, while men may never move out of the family home, making it easier for them to drift away from society. As researchers continue to seek answers and policymakers scramble for solutions, hikikomori-like cases keep surfacing worldwide, from Europe to North America.

It’s clear that young men are struggling with a wide range of issues, but what’s less obvious is why right-wing populism speaks to them so deeply. The popular narrative in mainstream discourse is toxic masculinity and a lack of positive male role models. The New Zealand media blamed a “toxic, alt-right echo chamber” for influencing Tarrant’s beliefs (Purtill, 2019). In fact, fewer than 10% of news reports mentioned his name, and the media was required to pixelate his face during court proceedings to prevent the spread of extremist ideas. However, this perspective overlooks a crucial point: for disenfranchised young men to embrace right-wing populism, they must first reject – or feel rejected – by other ideologies.

The U.S. Democratic party appears to be aware of this problem, as the group recently allocated $20 million to study how they can better connect with young men. The results so far are bleak. Only 27% of young men rated the Democratic party positively – 24 percentage points lower than their view of the Republican party (Schneider, 2025). The focus groups shed further light on the challenges facing Democrats. An Asian American professional painted Democrats as championing “the fluid masculinity of being, like, empathetic and sensitive,” in contrast to Republicans, who embody “the traditional masculinity of a provider, strong, and the machismo type.” A Latino man agreed, pointing to Kamala Harris’s 2024 campaign as an example. He said Harris boasted, “Oh, I got Beyonce on stage with me. Oh, I got Lady Gaga on stage,” and “it just kind of felt like, what does that have to do with me? I’m trying to move up in life.” Young men are not a lost generation yet, but if they continue to feel abandoned by left-leaning priorities, they will move further toward the populist right.

Technology is a game-changer

The rise of technology, particularly social media, has made it even easier for young men to fall down the right-wing populist rabbit hole. Rather than tuning into cable news, more and more young men are turning to alternative media platforms like podcasts for information (Morrow, 2024). According to Spotify, the top three U.S. podcasts are “The Joe Rogan Experience”, “The Tucker Carlson Show”, and “This Past Weekend w/ Theo Von”. One is overtly right-leaning, while the other two are known for regularly featuring guests with populist views, such as President Trump and Russell Brand. Podcasts appeal to young men through their intimacy and authenticity. For instance, Rogan’s podcast, which consists of an audience that is 80% male, with half aged 18-34, is renowned for its unapologetic masculinity and focus on topics like combat sports and critiques of identity politics (Edison Research, 2024). Furthermore, his comedic and casual style makes polarizing ideas more digestible.

Not only has the left largely ignored unconventional media outlets, but it has also framed the rise of male-centered online content negatively, often labeling it as the “manosphere”. The term is typically associated with misogyny and sexism as well as linked to highly controversial figures like Andrew Tate (Franklin-Paddock et al., 2025). The issue is that treating the manosphere as a terrible disease, instead of as a symptom of a broader sentiment among young men that their problems are being ignored, only exacerbates the very sense of rejection they feel from the left. Mariel Barnes and Sabrina Karim, both professors of public policy, claim that “excluding the manosphere from political conversation inhibits a comprehensive understanding of contentious politics.” They do not excuse or condone the toxic behaviors of the manosphere, but instead emphasize the importance of understanding its underlying motivations and mindset (Barnes & Karim, 2025).

Despite the surging popularity of podcasts and the manosphere, they remain relatively niche spaces. Conversely, social media resembles an ocean of information: vast, unfiltered, and constantly evolving. Yet it’s another platform dominated by right-wing populists and neglected by leftist parties. X, formerly known as Twitter, has been described as supercharging conservative discourse, especially following Elon Musk’s takeover (Conroy, 2025). The EU is currently investigating X for potential violations related to illegal content and disinformation. Meanwhile, in December 2024, the Romanian presidential election was cancelled amid warnings of Russian influence via TikTok after the mysterious ultranationalist candidate Călin Georgescu won the first round (Ings, 2025). Given that both X (63.7%) and TikTok (55.7%) have a higher proportion of male users, it’s no wonder they’re more accepting of populist messaging. As American novelist Josiah Gilbert Holland once said, “The soul, like the body, lives by what it feeds on.”

Conclusion

As right-wing populism capitalizes on young men’s struggles, from limited prospects of starting families to sky-high societal expectations, and leverages technology to expand its reach, leftist parties face a critical choice: confront these growing frustrations head-on or risk being left behind. This is no easy decision, as doing so may alienate other parts of their voting base, particularly young women. What they cannot do is just handwave this phenomenon away.

Overall, the future belongs to Gen Z, but with each passing day, it seems likelier and likelier that a specific subset of young men are unwilling to follow the same path as their progressive peers. For many of these “Lost Boys”, it’s less about being attracted to right-wing rhetoric and more about feeling pushed away by the rest of the world. At the end of the day, this goes beyond political infighting or economic productivity. The world is not a zero-sum game – caring about young men who feel lonely and unloved doesn’t mean diminishing concern for other genders. In fact, it can be a way to bring everyone a little closer, because when we abandon them, we lose a part of our shared humanity.

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